## AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 927

Y 4. IN 8/16: C 89/9

An Amendment in the Wature of a Sub....T

REFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H.R. 927

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995

MARCH 22, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

SEP 12 1995

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### AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 927

#### WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 1995

House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:11 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. BURTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

The subcommittee meets in open session to consider H.R. 927, the "Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act." This bill was introduced on February 14, 1995, and was referred to the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. The chair has prepared an amendment in the nature of a substitute that has been shared with the members of the subcommittee. We will move that amendment as we begin debate on the bill.

Before we begin the formal process of considering this bill, I have a few comments. I will then recognize other members of the sub-

committee for general comments.

I would like to welcome everybody to our markup on the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995. We believe that this legislation will contribute significantly to the advancement of democracy and freedom in Cuba. This bill was introduced last month, along with its companion bill in the Senate which was introduced by Senator Helms. It has wide bipartisan support and the administration has indicated that it is genuinely supportive.

We will continue to discuss with the administration those issues upon which there may be some disagreement. We look forward to

the administration's full and formal support.

Today, we will be marking up an amendment in which there will be a substitute which incorporates minor technical changes to the original. The thrust of the legislation remains the same. It is three

major parts.

Title I aims mainly at the enforcement and strengthening of sanctions against the brutal Castro regime. It also strengthens TV Marti. Title II involves support for a real democratic transition in Cuba. And Title III imposes penalties on foreigners who traffic confiscated U.S. property; and creates a right of action in U.S. courts for U.S. citizens who have had their property confiscated.

We hope that this legislation will move expediently through the full committee and House floor action, as well as passage by the Senate. It is our intention to keep the heat on Fidel Castro, to keep our faith with the people of Cuba, and to keep our commitment to promote democracy in this hemisphere. The number one objective of this committee is and will continue to be to have a free and democratic Cuba established without a dictatorship.

And with that, I will be happy to yield to my good friend, Mr.

Menendez, for his opening remarks.

Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for bringing this legislation so quickly to consideration. We share with you the belief that our mutual goal, which is creating a free and independent Cuba, and an opportunity for the Cuban people to so have and enjoy that possibility is further moved by this legislation.

I am happy to see that you have included in your bill that part of Title II, which is that part of the bill that we have been working on for the last 2 years, and creating a transition in Cuba and assisting the people of Cuba in sending a beacon of light to the people of Cuba in terms of assistance to them as they move to a transition to a democratic government, and ultimately to a democratically elected government.

And in order not to delay the process any further, we look for-

ward to voting with you on this piece of legislation.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. I will now recognize the gentlelady

from Florida.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a quick note also to congratulate you for your great leadership in moving this bill through the process. We hope to get it before the full committee shortly, and then, of course, to the floor before the summer. And the Senate, of course, is going to be moving on this bill in May,

as you pointed out to us in our last hearing.

I continue to be concerned about the number of U.S. businesses that are involved in trips to Cuba to buildup supposedly good relations post-Castro. Yet they seem to be quite involved in building up those relationships now, and I know that our committee is taking a hard look at those companies and how the negotiations that are taking place between those businesses and the Castro regime, and we hope that the administration will work with us in making sure that we are not making an end-run there on the embargo.

Also, I would like to encourage the administration to work with us so that we can move this bill along. We know that they have certain reservations, but we notice that there is still no amendments in front of us today. That once again we say we are willing

to cooperate, and we hope that that process moves along.

But if not, we will, I am sure, continue our efforts to get this bill on the floor, and because this sends a very optimistic, hopeful message to the enslaved people of Cuba that our committee and the members of the U.S. Congress care very deeply about the repression and the oppression that they have to live with day in and day out; and that we will do our part to making sure that that dictator is replaced with a free and democratic government. We hope that that day will come very soon. And I thank you for your leadership. Mr. Chairman, in speeding that day along. Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

I would just say that we have talked with the administration. So far they have not pointed out any real problems they have with the bill. They have reserved judgment on a few sections of it, but I do not anticipate any real problem. If we have any administration people here today, I hope they will convey our thanks to the administration for being cooperative.

Mr. Wynn.

Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. But in the interest of time I will not make an opening statement at this time.

I would like to reserve the right to enter a statement in the record at a later time.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection.

Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BURTON. Do we have anyone else? Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to at the outset commend the chairman of the subcommittee for the leadership he has shown. And also I would like to express a particular thanks to Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen and Congressman Menendez who have an acute awareness and sensitivity to the tremendous hardships and sufferings endured by the

people of Cuba.

I am proud to be a cosponsor of this bill, and I look forward to its passage because I think it is absolutely imperative, not just in America's national interest, but for international morality and decency, that we have a free and democratic Cuba and that Castro no longer be allowed to impose his iron will on the suffering people of Cuba.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Representative King.

Representative Ballenger, you have an opening statement?

Mr. BALLENGER. I do not.

Mr. Burton. All right. I will now ask the subcommittee Staff Director to report H.R. 927.

Mr. KAPEN. H.R. 927, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity

Section 1, Short Title: Table of Contents.

(a) Short Title—This Act may be cited as the "Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995."

(b) Table of Contents—The table of contents—

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Chairman, I would like to move that the bill be considered as read.

Mr. Burton. Without objection, the bill is considered as read. Before I get into the actual marking up of the bill, let me just

make two brief comments.

First of all, I want to thank the committee staff for all their hard work in putting this together, and it has taken a lot of time, and

I think there has been some heartache involved as well.

But I also want to thank those organizations outside the hallowed halls of Congress who have worked so hard to help bring about this legislation, to get it passed, and to send a very, very strong signal to Fidel Castro that his days are numbered. And two of those organizations I would like to mention are the Cuban American Foundation. They have worked very, very hard to assist us. The Vallederas Foundation has also worked with us to try to craft this legislation. There have been other Cuban organizations who have worked with us. And to all of them I want to say thank you very, very much for your hard work and continued effort to make

sure that one day we can all visit Havana without experiencing the problems that dictatorships cause, and that the people of Cuba will be free, truly free.

The Chair will lay before the subcommittee an amendment in the

nature of a substitute, which the Staff Director will report.

Mr. KAPEN. The amendment offered by Mr. Burton. Strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following: Mr. Burton. Without objection the amendment will be consid-

ered as read.

ered as read.

[The amendment of Mr. Burton appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BURTON. The amendment in the nature of a substitute is now open to amendment at any point.

Are there any amendments to the substitute?

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman. Mr. BURTON. Mr. Torricelli.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I have an amendment on page 42.

Do you have it? I do not know if the members have it.

Mr. Burton. Do any of the other members have a copy of the amendment? Would you hand it down to them, please.

Mr. BURTON. Let me have the Staff Director report the amend-

ment.

Mr. KAPEN. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a

substitute to H.R. 927 offered by Mr. Torricelli.

Page 42, (1)(3) insert the following: (I) Allowing the establishment of an independent trade union as set forth in section 8798, National Labor Organization, allowing the establishment of independent social, economic and political associations.

[The amendment of Mr. Torricelli appears in the appendix.]

Mr. Burton. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, on page 42 in section I, the legislation calls for allowing the establishment of independent labor movement in Cuba. I have simply adjusted the language to take the same provision of the United States as used previously in our confrontations with dictators, and calling for a free labor movement by taking the language that has been used in international conventions.

And this way those who would distinguish between the Cuban embargo and what we experienced in South Africa, Rhodesia, or a host of other embargoes, would lose the opportunity to see a distinction. This is the same language, with the same purpose, against

the same kind of despotic regime.

I think rhetorically it puts us on a stronger foundation and clear-

ly has us in concert with international labor standards.

Mr. Burton. Is there further discussion on the amendment? My staff and I have read the amendment. We think the amendment has a great deal of merit and will add to the bill. I would like to once again thank Representative Torricelli for all of his hard

work on this legislation and previous legislation. Further discussion on the amendment?

If not, the Chair will put the question on the amendment. As many as favor the amendment, say aye.

[Chorus of aves.]

Mr. BURTON. Those opposed?

[No response.]

Mr. BURTON. The amendment is carried.

Are there further amendments?

Representative—

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment which I believe has been distributed.

Mr. BURTON. Do we have copies of Mr. Menendez' amendment?

The Staff Director will report the amendment.

Mr. KAPEN. The amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Menendez.

Add the following at the end of section 102(e), violations

under—

Mr. Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I would move that the amendment be considered as read.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection.

[The amendment of Mr. Menendez appears in the appendix.] Mr. BURTON. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, the amendment that I am offering removes a loophole available to groups and individuals who blatantly violate U.S. law. The loophole has the effect of nullifying the civil penalties available against violators under the Cuban Democracy Act. A similar provision does not exist for any of our other embargoes currently in place in North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Serbia and Angola, and we simply seek to make the Cuban embargo consistent with all of the others.

With this amendment, we continue to allow the wide range of activities permitted under the Cuban Democracy Act as Congressman Torricelli wrote, but with this difference. Henceforth, we will be able to ensure that those who genuinely seek to provide material and other assistance to the Cuban people will be enabled to do so. But those who seek to aid Fidel Castro, in flagrant violation of U.S.

law, will not be able to do so.

I believe that the amendment will also save us a significant amount of money in the process as OFAC, the Office of Foreign Asset Control has told us, in terms of their difficulties in pursuing this part of the law, and I think that the combination of making sure that we remove a loophole that exists, that we strengthen the possibilities to make sure that people get the help they need, but at the same time those who are not really helping the Cuban people can be pursued by OFAC and saving money at the same time.

It is a worthy amendment and I ask my colleagues to be support-

ive of it.

Mr. Burton. The Chair and the staff has reviewed the amendment and find that it is very meritorious and will add to the legislation. We support it.

Is there further discussion on the amendment?

If not, the Chair will put the question.

All those in favor will demonstrate by saying aye.

[Chorus of ayes.]

Mr. BURTON. Those opposed?

[No response.]

Mr. Burton. The amendment passes.

Are there further amendments?

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON, Mr. Wynn.

Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do not have an amendment but I do have a question if I might be permitted to inquire as to whether any representatives from the administration is present?

Mr. BURTON. Are there any members of the administration

present?

I do not see any, Mr. Wynn.

Mr. WYNN. OK. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to note that I had a question regarding two terms that are used in the bill. One is a transition government in Cuba, and the other is a democratically elected government in Cuba, and there seem to be some differences in both those definitions.

And should this bill, and I assume it will, get before the full com-

mittee, I would like to pursue that issue.

But I have no further comment or question at this time. Thank

Mr. BURTON. The transition government is one that we are going to work with during the transition period between the dictatorship that Castro now forces upon the people of Cuba and the democracy which we hope to see achieved.

The democratic government, which we will be assisting, will be the one that is formed after the Cubans through this process and

have a constitution and free elections.

Mr. WYNN. That certainly makes sense to me. My question that I would direct to the administration would be whether the definitions or explanations that are contained in the body are consistent with U.S. policy with regard to how those terms are defined. But I do not see that there is a problem for today's markup.

Mr. Burton. I would just say that we had a hearing last week,

and I think you attended.

Mr. Wynn. I was present.

Mr. Burton. We asked the administration to give us any questions or concerns that they had about the legislation. Our staff met with them over the last 2 to 3 days and we have found no problems with this language.

Mr. WYNN. Well, that being the case, I am sure there will not

be any problems when we get to full committee. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

Are there further amendments?

The Chair hearing none will proceed on with the bill as amended.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, is it your intention to proceed immediately to vote?

Mr. Burton. It is unless there are further amendments.

Mr. TORRICELLI. May I be recognized for a moment?

Mr. Burton, I would be happy to recognize the gentleman from

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, first, you deserve the thanks and congratulations for bringing this legislation forward on such an expedited basis.

Second, I simply want to add that I trust all those who follow events in Cuba will note that this committee is not simply moving to strengthen the embargo, but we have done in the opening days of this Congress on a bipartisan basis, with no internal opposition.

For those who continue to believe that there is division in the U.S. Government over policy to Cuba, there is remarkably little division. There are those who think that the embargo has reached its strength and we are beginning to lessen our determination, nothing

could be further from the truth.

This legislation adds upon the actions of this committee 2 years ago in strengthening the U.S. embargo. It is the clearest signal I know that we have no intention of changing our policy or compromising our principle. There is going to be a free election in Cuba. The people of Cuba are going to change their government. They are going to have an opportunity to choose their own leaders. And until they do, this country will remain resolute with our embargo.

I am also convinced, Mr. Chairman, based on the hearing that you chaired last week, that not only will this House and the Senate pass this legislation, but indeed I was impressed by the favorable

testimony from the Clinton administration.

The administration has offered to work with us in what I hope will prove to be very minor modifications that will allow the Presi-

dent to sign this legislation.

So to the international business community that would invest in Cuba in stolen American assets, they should begin to accept the reality that this legislation is going to become the law, and they are going to have to choose between those stolen assets and access to

the United States.

People who import Cuban sugar will have to deal with the reality of continuing to have market access to the United States. And those within Cuba who are deciding whether or not to take a stand against the dictatorship should also start to recognize the larger principle that things are not getting better with the United States; they are getting worse. And that means the need to take a stand is all the greater.

In any case, Mr. Chairman, I trust that people will see not simply that we have passed this legislation, but the means, the speed

and the unity with which we do so is a very powerful signal.

I thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Torricelli.

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Wynn.

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend you on your strong and decisive efforts on this issue, and I think there is a consensus, as was indicated, against the Castro regime and the condi-

tions that they have imposed on the people of Cuba.

At the same time there is a sentiment, I think, in this country that questions of access by family members to visit their family members who reside in Cuba remains a question of some concern. Also, the ability of family members who want to provide financial assistance to relatives residing in Cuba continues to be an issue.

Having said that, I would only indicate that perhaps at the full committee level we could explore the extent to which this legisla-

tion might accommodate those concerns.

Other than that, Mr. Chairman, again I just reiterate my appreciation for your efforts.

Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Wynn.

Further comments?

If not, let me end by saying the embargo allows medical supplies and food stuffs to get into Cuba. We understand that there are some hardships that have been caused by the embargo. That was intended in order to put pressure on the Castro government to leave power and to allow free and democratic elections.

As we are pressuring the Cuban Government, Fidel Castro, and his brother Raul, we want to make sure there was no lack of humanitarian aid to the Cuban people who really need it. The Cuban Democracy Act, sponsored by my colleague, Mr. Torricelli, dealt

with that, so I do not think this issue is a big problem.

One other thing I would like to comment on before we put the bill to a vote, is that I was very impressed, like Mr. Torricelli, last week, when the administration showed support for much of what we are trying to do. The only disturbing thing that I have seen has been reports in the newspapers that some people in the administration over the past few months have talked about lifting various parts of the embargo. I do not think that is productive, especially when the administration, the State Department and the Congress seems to agree that we want to put more pressure on Castro until we get free and democratic Cuban elections.

I think my colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans, would agree that anyone who is a loose cannon in the administration should listen to what the President has said, and has written to us. He supports the embargo. Dissenters should also listen to what the State Department has been saying when they testify before this committee and the full International Relations Committee.

I want to commend the entire committee for their hard work on this piece of legislation. We will be sending it to the full committee. We will be contacting Mr. Gilman, Chairman of the International Relations Committee, to expedite this legislation as quickly as possible, and get it to the floor for a vote.

If there are no further amendments, the Chair will put the ques-

tion on the amendment in the nature of a substitute.

As many are in favor will say aye.

[Chorus of ayes.]

Mr. Burton. Those opposed will say no.

[No response.]

Mr. Burton. The ayes have it, and the amendment is agreed to.

The Chair will now recognize—

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, request a vote on that. Mr. Burton. You would like to have a recorded vote?

Mr. WYNN. Yes, please.

Mr. Burton. The gentleman has requested a recorded vote.

The staff will call the role. Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Burton.

Mr. Burton. Aye.

Mr. KAPEN. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Ave.

Mr. KAPEN, Mr. Ballenger.

Mr. Ballenger. Aye.

Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Smith.

[No response.]

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Gallegly.

[No response.]

Mr. KAPEN. Mr. King.

Mr. KING. Aye.

Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Torricelli.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Aye.

Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Aye. Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Wynn.

Mr. WYNN. Present. Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Lantos.

[No response.]

Mr. Burton. The staff will report the totals on the vote?

Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Martinez.

[No response.]

Mr. KAPEN. Six voting aye, one voting present, none voting nay. Mr. BURTON. The amendment is agreed to, and now the Chair will recognize Ms. Ros-Lehtinen to offer a motion.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I move that the subcommittee report H.R. 927, as amended, to the Committee on International Relations with the recommendation that the bill as amended be favorably reported to the Full House.

Mr. BURTON. The question is on the motion. On this motion I ask

that we have a roll call vote.

All those in favor will signify by saying aye, and those opposed will say no. The staff will call the role.

Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Aye.

Mr. KAPEN. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Aye. Mr. Kapen. Mr. Ballenger.

Mr. BALLENGER. Aye. Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Smith.

[No response.]

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Gallegly.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Aye. Mr. KAPEN. Mr. King.

Mr. KING. Aye.

Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Torricelli.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Aye.

Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Aye. Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Wynn.

Mr. WYNN. Present.

Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Lantos.

[No response.]

Mr. KAPEN. Mr. Martinez.

[No response.]

Mr. Burton. The staff will report the tally.

Mr. KAPEN. Seven vote aye, one voting present, none voting no.

Mr. Burton. That being the case the bill is passed. We will be reporting this bill to the full committee, and we will be taking action on it in the very near future.

This meeting stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m, the subcommittee was adjourned.]

#### APPENDIX

# AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 927 OFFERED BY MR. BURTON

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

- 1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE: TABLE OF CONTENTS.
- 2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
- 3 "Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
- 4 Act of 1995".
- 5 (b) Table of Contents.—The table of contents of
- 6 this Act is as follows:
  - Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
  - Sec. 2. Findings.
  - Sec. 3. Purposes.
  - Sec. 4. Definitions.

#### TITLE I—SEEKING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

- Sec. 101. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 102. Enforcement of the economic embargo of Cuba.
- Sec. 103. Prohibition against indirect financing of the Castro dictatorship.
- Sec. 104. United States opposition to Cuban membership in international financial institutions.
- Sec. 105. United States opposition to ending the suspension of the Government of Cuba from the Organization of American States.
- Sec. 106. Assistance by the independent states of the former Soviet Union of the Government of Cuba.
- Sec. 107. Television broadcasting to Cuba.
- Sec. 108. Reports on assistance and commerce received by Cuba from other foreign countries.
- Sec. 109. Importation sanction against certain Cuban trading partners.
- Sec. 110. Authorization of support for democratic and human rights groups and international observers.

#### TITLE II-ASSISTANCE TO A FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

- Sec. 201. Policy toward a transition government and a democratically elected government in Cuba.
- Sec. 202. Authorization of assistance for the Cuban people.

	2
	Sec. 203. Coordination of assistance program; implementation and reports to Congress; reprogramming.  Sec. 204. Authorization of appropriations.  Sec. 205. Termination of the economic embargo of Cuba.  Sec. 206. Requirements for a transition government.  Sec. 207. Requirements for a democratically elected government.
	TITLE III—PROTECTION OF AMERICAN PROPERTY RIGHTS $_{\mbox{\scriptsize ABROAD}}$
	<ul> <li>See, 301. Exclusion from the United States of aliens who have confiscated property of United States nationals.</li> <li>Sec. 302. Liability for trafficking in property confiscated from United States nationals.</li> <li>Sec. 303. Claims to confiscated property.</li> <li>Sec. 304. Amendment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.</li> </ul>
1	SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
2	The Congress makes the following findings:
3	(1) The economy of Cuba has experienced a de-
4	cline of at least 60 percent in the last 5 years as a
5	result of—
6	(A) the end of its subsidization by the
7	former Soviet Union of between 5 billion and 6
8	billion dollars annually;
9	(B) 36 years of Communist tyranny and
10	economic mismanagement by the Castro govern-
11	ment;
12	(C) the extreme decline in trade between
13	Cuba and the countries of the former Soviet
14	bloe; and
15	(D) the policy of the Russian Government
16	and the countries of the former Soviet bloc to
17	conduct economic relations with Cuba on strict-
18	ly commercial terms.

- (2) At the same time, the welfare and health of the Cuban people have substantially deteriorated as a result of this economic decline and the refusal of the Castro regime to permit free and fair democratic elections in Cuba.
- (3) The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it will not engage in any substantive political reforms that would lead to democracy, a market economy, or an economic recovery.
- (4) The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on free and fair democratic elections, and continuing violation of fundamental human rights has isolated the Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western Hemisphere.
- (5) As long as free elections are not held in Cuba, the economic condition of the country and the welfare of the Cuban people will not improve in any significant way.
- (6) The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to improve their condition and has led thousands of Cuban citizens to risk or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape from Cuba to freedom.

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- (7) Radio Marti and Television Marti have both been effective vehicles for providing the people of Cuba with news and information and have helped to bolster the morale of the people of Cuba living under tyranny.
  - (8) The consistent policy of the United States towards Cuba since the beginning of the Castro regime, carried out by both Democratic and Republican administrations, has sought to keep faith with the people of Cuba, and has been effective in sanctioning the totalitarian Castro regime.
- (9) The United States has shown a deep commitment, and considers it a moral obligation, to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- (10) The Congress has historically and consistently manifested its solidarity and the solidarity of the American people with the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.
- (11) The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 calls upon the President to encourage the governments of countries that conduct trade with Cuba to restrict

their trade and credit relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes of that Act.

- (12) The 1992 FREEDOM Support Act requires that the President, in providing economic assistance to Russia and the emerging Eurasian democracies, take into account the extent to which they are acting to "terminate support for the communist regime in Cuba, including removal of troops, closing military facilities, and ceasing trade subsidies and economic, nuclear, and other assistance".
- (13) The Government of Cuba engages in the illegal international narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from justice in the United States.
- (14) The Castro government threatens international peace and security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups dedicated to international violence.
- (15) The Castro government has utilized from its inception and continues to utilize torture in various forms (including by psychiatry), as well as execution, exile, confiscation, political imprisonment, and other forms of terror and repression, as means of retaining power.

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(16) Fidel Castro has defined democratic pluralism as "pluralistic garbage" and continues to make clear that he has no intention of tolerating the democratization of Cuban society. (17) The Castro government holds innocent Cubans hostage in Cuba by no fault of the hostages themselves solely because relatives have escaped the country. (18) Although a signatory state to the 1928 Inter-American Convention on Asylum and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which protects the right to leave one's own country), Cuba nevertheless surrounds embassies in its capital by armed forces to thwart the right of its citizens to seek asylum and systematically denies that right to the Cuban people, punishing them by imprisonment for seeking to leave the country and killing them for attempting to do so (as demonstrated in the case of the confirmed murder of over 40 men, women, and children who were seeking to leave Cuba on July 13, 1994). (19) The Castro government continues to utilize blackmail, such as the immigration crisis with which it threatened the United States in the summer of 1994, and other unacceptable and illegal forms of

- conduct to influence the actions of sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere in violation of the Charter of the Organization of American States and other international agreements and international law.
  - (20) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights situation in Cuba and has taken the extraordinary step of appointing a Special Rapporteur.
  - (21) The Government of Cuba has consistently refused access to the Special Rapporteur and formally expressed its decision not to "implement so much as one comma" of the United Nations Resolutions appointing the Rapporteur.
  - (22) The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 1992/70 on December 4, 1992, Resolution 1993/48/142 on December 20, 1993, and Resolution 1994/49/544 on October 19, 1994, referencing the Special Rapporteur's reports to the United Nations and condemning "violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms" in Cuba.
  - (23) Article 39 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides that the United Nations Security Council "shall determine the existence of

any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . , to maintain or restore international peace and security.".

- (24) The United Nations has determined that massive and systematic violations of human rights may constitute a "threat to peace" under Article 39 and has imposed sanctions due to such violations of human rights in the cases of Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia.
- (25) In the case of Haiti, a neighbor of Cuba not as close to the United States as Cuba, the United States led an effort to obtain and did obtain a United Nations Security Council embargo and blockade against that country due to the existence of a military dictatorship in power less than 3 years.
- (26) United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 of July 31, 1994, subsequently authorized the use of "all necessary means" to restore the "democratically elected government of Haiti", and the democratically elected government of Haiti was restored to power on October 15, 1994.
- (27) The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive manner to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 36 years and the continued failure

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1	to do so constitutes ethically improper conduct by
2	the international community.
3	(28) For the past 36 years, the Cuban govern-
4	ment has posed and continues to pose a national se-
5	curity threat against the United States.
6	SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
7	The purposes of this Act are as follows:
8	(1) To assist the Cuban people in regaining
9	their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining
10	the communities of democracies that are flourishing
1	in the Western Hemisphere.
12	(2) To seek international sanctions against the
13	Castro government in Cuba.
14	(3) To encourage the holding of free and fair,
15	democratic elections in Cuba, conducted under the
16	supervision of internationally recognized observers.
7	(4) To develop a plan for furnishing assistance
8	to a transition government and, subsequently, to a
9	democratically elected government when such gov-
20	ernments meet the eligibility requirements of this
21	Act.
22	(5) To protect property rights abroad of United
23	States nationals.

SEC.	4 1	OF	DIN	TTI	ONIC

2	As use	l in	this	Act,	the	following	terms	have	the	fol-
3	lowing mean	ing	g.							

- 4 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT5 TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com6 mittees" means the Committee on International Re7 lations and the Committee on Appropriations of the
  8 House of Representatives and the Committee on
  9 Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropria-
  - (2) Confiscated.—The term "confiscated" refers to the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure of ownership or control of property by governmental authority—
    - (A) without adequate and effective compensation or otherwise in violation of the law of the place where the property was situated when the confiscation occurred; and
    - (B) without the claim to the property having been settled pursuant to an international claims settlement agreement.
  - (3) Cuban government.—The term "Cuban government" includes the government of any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.

1	(4) Democratically elected government
2	IN CUBA.—The term "democratically elected govern
3	ment in Cuba" means a government described in
4	section 207.
5	(5) ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF CUBA.—The term
6	"economic embargo of Cuba" refers to the economic
7	embargo imposed against Cuba pursuant to section
8	620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
9	U.S.C. 2370(a)), section 5(b) of the Trading With
10	the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)), the Inter-
11	national Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the
12	Export Administration Act of 1979.
13	(6) Property.—The term "property" means—
14	(A) any property, right, or interest, includ-
15	ing any leasehold interest,
16	(B) debts owed by a foreign government or
17	by any enterprise which has been confiscated by
18	a foreign government; and
19	(C) debts which are a charge on property
20	confiscated by a foreign government.
21	(7) Traffics.—(A) The term "traffics" means
22	to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise
23	dispose of property, or to purchase, receive, possess,
24	obtain control of, manage, or use property.

1	(B) The term "traffics" does not include the
2	delivery of international telecommunication signal
3	to Cuba that are authorized in the Cuban Democ
4	racy Act of 1992.
5	(8) Transition government in Cuba.—The
6	term "transition government in Cuba" means a gov
7	ernment described in section 206.
8	(9) United States Person.—The term
9	"United States person" means (A) any United
10	States citizen, and (B) any corporation, trust, part
11	nership, or other juridical entity 50 percent or more
12	beneficially owned by United States citizens.
12	TITLE I-SEEKING SANCTIONS
13	TITLE I-SEERING SANCTIONS
13	AGAINST THE CASTRO GOV-
14	AGAINST THE CASTRO GOV-
14 15	AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT
14 15 16	AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
14 15 16 17	AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT  SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.  It is the sense of the Congress that—
14 15 16 17 18	AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT  SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.  It is the sense of the Congress that—  (1) the acts of the Castro government, includ-
14 15 16 17 18	AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT  SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.  It is the sense of the Congress that—  (1) the acts of the Castro government, including its massive, systematic, and extraordinary viola-
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT  SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.  It is the sense of the Congress that—  (1) the acts of the Castro government, including its massive, systematic, and extraordinary violations of human rights, are a threat to international
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT  SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.  It is the sense of the Congress that—  (1) the acts of the Castro government, including its massive, systematic, and extraordinary violations of human rights, are a threat to international peace;
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	AGAINST THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT  SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY.  It is the sense of the Congress that—  (1) the acts of the Castro government, including its massive, systematic, and extraordinary violations of human rights, are a threat to international peace;  (2) the President should advocate, and should

1	national embargo against the totalitarian govern-
2	ment of Cuba pursuant to chapter VII of the Char-
3	ter of the United Nations, which is similar to meas-
4	ures taken by United States representatives with re-
5	spect to Haiti; and
6	(3) any resumption or commencement of efforts
7	by any state to make operational the nuclear facility
8	at Cienfuegos, Cuba, will have a detrimental impact
9	on United States assistance to and relations with
10	such state.
11	SEC. 102. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF
12	CUBA.
13	(a) Policy.—(1) The Congress hereby reaffirms sec-
14	tion 1704(a) of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 that
15	states the President should encourage foreign countries to
16	restrict trade and credit relations with Cuba.
17	(2) The Congress further urges the President to take
18	immediate steps to apply the sanctions described in section
19	1704(b) of such Act against countries assisting Cuba.
20	(b) DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.—The Secretary of State
21	shall ensure that United States diplomatic personnel
22	abroad understand and, in their contacts with foreign offi-
23	cials are—
24	(1) communicating the reasons for the United
25	States economic embargo of Cuba; and

1	(2)	urging	for eign	governments	to	cooperate
2	more effe	ctively	with the	embargo.		

- 3 (e) Existing Regulations.—The President should
- 4 instruct the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney
- 5 General to enforce fully the Cuban Assets Control Regula-
- 6 tions in part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
- 7 (d) Trading With the Enemy Act.—Subsection
- 8 (b) of section 16 of the Trading With the Enemy Act (50
- 9 U.S.C. App. 16(b)) is amended to read as follows:
- 10 "(b)(1) A civil penalty of not to exceed \$50,000 may
- 11 be imposed by the Secretary of the Treasury on any per-
- 12 son who violates any license, order, rule, or regulation is-
- 13 sued in compliance with the provisions of this Act.
- 14 "(2) Any property, funds, securities, papers, or other
- 15 articles or documents, or any vessel, together with its tack-
- 16 le, apparel, furniture, and equipment, that is the subject
- 17 of a violation under paragraph (1) shall, at the discretion
- 18 of the Secretary of the Treasury, be forfeited to the United
- 19 States Government.
- 20 "(3) Judicial review of any penalty imposed under
- 21 this subsection may be had to the extent provided in sec-
- 22 tion 702 of title 5, United States Code.".

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1	SEC. 103. PROHIBITION AGAINST INDIRECT FINANCING OF
2	THE CASTRO DICTATORSHIP.
3	(a) PROHIBITION.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
4	sion of law, no loan, credit, or other financing may be ex-
5	tended knowingly by a United States person or by a Unit-
6	ed States agency to a foreign person to finance trans-
7	actions involving any property confiscated by the Cuban
8	government the claim to which is owned by a United
9	States person as of the date of enactment of this Act.
10	(b) TERMINATION OF PROHIBITION.—The prohibi-
11	tion of subsection (a) shall cease to apply on the date of
12	termination of the economic embargo of Cuba.
13	(e) Penalties.—Violations of subsection (a) shall be
14	punishable by the same penalties as are applicable to simi-
15	lar violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations in
16	part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
17	(d) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—
18	(1) the term "foreign person" means (A) an
19	alien, and (B) any corporation, trust, partnership, or
20	other juridical entity that is not 50 percent or more
21	beneficially owned by United States citizens; and
22	(2) the term "United States agency" has the
23	same meaning given to the term "agency" in section
24	551(1) of title 5, United States Code.

2	SHIP IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTI-
3	TUTIONS.
4	(a) Continued Opposition to Cuban Member-
5	ship in International Financial Institutions.— $(1)$
6	Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary of the
7	Treasury shall instruct the United States executive direc-
8	tor to each international financial institution to use the
9	voice and vote of the United States to oppose the admis-
10	sion of Cuba as a member of such institution until Cuba
11	holds free and fair, democratic elections, conducted under
12	the supervision of internationally recognized observers.
13	(2) During the period that a transition government
14	is in power in Cuba, the President shall take steps to sup-
15	port the processing of Cuba's application for membership
16	in any international financial institution subject to the
17	membership taking effect after a democratically elected
18	government is in power in Cuba.
19	(b) REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES PAYMENTS TO
20	International Financial Institutions.—If any
21	international financial institution approves a loan or other
22	assistance to Cuba over the opposition of the United
23	States, then the Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold
24	from payment to such institution an amount equal to the
25	amount of the loan or other assistance to the Cuban gov-

1	ernment, with respect to each of the following types of
2	payment:
3	(1) The paid-in portion of the increase in cap-
4	ital stock of the institution.
5	(2) The callable portion of the increase in cap-
6	ital stock of the institution.
7	(c) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section, the
8	term "international financial institution" means the Inter-
9	national Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Re-
0	construction and Development, the International Develop-
1	ment Association, the International Finance Corporation,
2	the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency, and the
3	Inter-American Development Bank.
4	SEC. 105. UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO ENDING THE
5	SUSPENSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA
6	FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
7	STATES.
8	The President should instruct the United States Per-
9	manent Representative to the Organization of American
)	States to vote against ending the suspension of the Gov-
1	ernment of Cuba from the Organization until the Presi-
2	dent determines under section $203(c)(3)$ that a democrat-
3	ically elected government in Cuba is in power.

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1	SEC. 106. ASSISTANCE BY THE INDEPENDENT STATES O
2	THE FORMER SOVIET UNION OF THE GOV
3	ERNMENT OF CUBA.
4	(a) Reporting Requirement.—Not later than 9
5	days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Presider
6	shall submit to the appropriate congressional committee
7	a report detailing progress towards the withdrawal of per
8	sonnel of any independent state of the former Sovie
9	Union (within the meaning of section 3 of the FREEDOM
10	Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5801)), including advisers, technic
11	cians, and military personnel, from the Cienfuegos nuclea
12	facility in Cuba.
13	(b) Criteria for Assistance.—Section
14	498A(a)(11) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (2)
15	U.S.C. $2295a(a)(1)$ ) is amended by striking "of militar,
16	facilities" and inserting "military and intelligence facili
17	ties, including the military and intelligence facilities a
18	Lourdes and Cienfuegos,".
19	(c) Ineligibility for Assistance.—(1) Section
20	498A(b) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2295a(b)) is amended—
21	(A) by striking "or" at the end of paragraph
22	(4);
23	(B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as para-
24	graph (6); and
25	(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the follow-
26	ing:

1	"(5) for the government of any independent
2	state effective 30 days after the President has deter-
3	mined and certified to the appropriate congressional
4	committees (and Congress has not enacted legisla-
5	tion disapproving the determination within the 30-
6	day period) that such government is providing as-
7	sistance for, or engaging in nonmarket based trade
8	(as defined in section 498B(k)(3)) with, the Govern-
9	ment of Cuba; or".
10	(2) Subsection (k) of section 498B of that Act (22
11	U.S.C. 2295b(k)), is amended by adding at the end the
12	following:
13	"(3) Nonmarket based trade.—As used in
14	section 498A(b)(5), the term 'nonmarket based
15	trade' includes exports, imports, exchanges, or other
16	arrangements that are provided for goods and serv-
17	ices (including oil and other petroleum products) on
18	terms more favorable than those generally available
19	in applicable markets or for comparable commod-
20	ities, including—
21	"(A) exports to the Government of Cuba
22	on terms that involve a grant, concessional
23	price, guaranty, insurance, or subsidy;
24	"(B) imports from the Government of
25	Cuba at preferential tariff rates; and

1	"(C) exchange arrangements that include
2	advance delivery of commodities, arrangements
3	in which the Government of Cuba is not held
4	accountable for unfulfilled exchange contracts,
5	and arrangements under which Cuba does not
6	pay appropriate transportation, insurance, or fi-
7	nance costs.".
8	(d) Facilities at Lourdes, Cuba.—(1) The Con-
9	gress expresses its strong disapproval of the extension by
0	Russia of credits equivalent to approximately
1	\$200,000,000 in support of the intelligence facility at
2	Lourdes, Cuba, in November 1994.
3	(2) Section 498A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
4	$1961~(22~\mathrm{U.S.C.}~2295a)$ is amended by adding at the end
5	the following new subsection:
6	"(d) REDUCTION IN ASSISTANCE FOR SUPPORT OF
7	Military and Intelligence Facilities in Cuba.— $(1)$
8	Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President
9	shall withhold from assistance allocated for an independ-
0	ent state of the former Soviet Union under this chapter
1	an amount equal to the sum of assistance and credits, if
2	any, provided by such state in support of military and in-
3	telligence facilities in Cuba, including the intelligence facil-
4	ity at Lourdes, Cuba.

- 1 "(2) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to 2 apply to—
- 3 "(A) assistance provided under the Soviet Nu-
- 4 clear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (title Π of Pub-
- 5 lic Law 102–228) or the Cooperative Threat Reduc-
- 6 tion Act of 1993 (title XII of Public Law 103–160);
- 7 or
- 8 "(B) assistance to meet urgent humanitarian
- 9 needs under section 498(1), including disaster as-
- 10 sistance described in subsection (c)(3) of this sec-
- 11 tion.".
- 12 SEC. 107. TELEVISION BROADCASTING TO CUBA.
- 13 (a) CONVERSION TO UHF.—The Director of the
- 14 United States Information Agency shall implement a con-
- 15 version of television broadcasting to Cuba under the Tele-
- 16 vision Marti Service to ultra high frequency (UHF) broad-
- 17 casting.
- 18 (b) Periodic Reports.—Not later than 45 days
- 9 after the date of enactment of this Act, and every three
- 20 months thereafter until the conversion described in sub-
- 21 section (a) is fully implemented, the Director shall submit
- 22 a report to the appropriate congressional committees on
- 23 the progress made in carrying out subsection (a).

l	SEC. 108. REPORTS ON ASSISTANCE AND COMMERCE RE
2	CEIVED BY CUBA FROM OTHER FOREIGN
3	COUNTRIES.
4	(a) REPORTS REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days
5	after the date of enactment of this Act, and every year
6	thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the ap
7	propriate congressional committees on assistance and
8	commerce received by Cuba from other foreign countries
9	during the preceding 12-month period.
10	(b) Contents of Reports.—Each report required
11	by subsection (a) shall, for the period covered by the re
12	port, contain the following:
13	(1) A description of all bilateral assistance pro-
14	vided to Cuba by other foreign countries, including
15	humanitarian assistance.
16	(2) A description of Cuba's commerce with for
17	eign countries, including an identification of Cuba's
18	trading partners and the extent of such trade.
19	(3) A description of the joint ventures com-
20	pleted, or under consideration, by foreign nationals
21	and business firms involving facilities in Cuba, in-
22	cluding an identification of the location of the facili-
23	ties involved and a description of the terms of agree-
24	ment of the joint ventures and the names of the par-
25	ties that are involved.

1	(4) A determination whether or not any of the
2	facilities described in paragraph (3) is the subject of
3	a claim against Cuba by a United States person.
4	(5) A determination of the amount of Cuban
5	debt owed to each foreign country, including the
6	amount of debt exchanged, forgiven, or reduced
7	under the terms of each investment or operation in
8	Cuba involving foreign nationals or businesses.
9	(6) A description of the steps taken to assure
10	that raw materials and semifinished or finished
11	goods produced by facilities in Cuba involving for-
12	eign nationals or businesses do not enter the United
13	States market, either directly or through third coun-
14	tries or parties.
15	SEC. 109. IMPORTATION SANCTION AGAINST CERTAIN
16	CUBAN TRADING PARTNERS.
17	(a) Sanction.—Notwithstanding any other provision
18	of law, sugars, syrups, molasses, and products with sugar
19	content in excess of 35 percent, that are the product of
20	a country that the President determines has imported
21	sugar, syrup, or molasses that is the product of Cuba,
22	shall not be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for
23	consumption, into the customs territory of the United
24	States, unless the condition set forth in subsection (b) is

25 met.

(b) CONDITION FOR REMOVAL OF SANCTION.—The 1 sanction set forth in subsection (a) shall cease to apply to a country if the country certifies to the President that the country will not import sugar, syrup, or molasses that is the product of Cuba until free and fair elections, conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observers, are held in Cuba. Such certification shall cease to be effective if the President makes a subsequent determination under subsection (a) with respect to that coun-10 try. (c) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—The President shall re-11 port to the appropriate congressional committees all determinations made under subsection (a) and all certifications made under subsection (b). (d) REALLOCATION OF SUGAR QUOTAS.—During any 15 period in which a sanction under subsection (a) is in effect with respect to a country, the President may reallocate to other countries the quota of sugars, syrups, and molasses allocated to that country, before the prohibition went 20 into effect, under chapter 17 of the Harmonized Tariff 21 Schedule of the United States.

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1	SEC. 110. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC
2	AND HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND INTER-
3	NATIONAL OBSERVERS.
4	The President is authorized to make available ade-
5	quate support for democracy-building efforts for Cuba, in-
6	cluding the following:
7	(1) Published and informational matter, such as
8	books, videos, and cassettes, on transitions to de-
9	mocracy, human rights, and market economies to be
10	made available to independent democratic groups in
11	Cuba.
12	(2) Humanitarian assistance to victims of polit-
13	ical repression and their families.
14	(3) Support for democratic and human rights
15	groups in Cuba.
16	(4) Support for visits and permanent deploy-
17	ment of independent international human rights
18	monitors in Cuba.
19	TITLE II—ASSISTANCE TO A
20	FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA
21	SEC. 201. POLICY TOWARD A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT
22	AND A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERN-
23	MENT IN CUBA.
24	The policy of the United States is as follows:
25	(1) To support the self-determination of the
26	Cuban people.

- 1 (2) To recognize that the self-determination of 2 the Cuban people is a sovereign and national right of the citizens of Cuba which must be exercised free 3 4 of interference by the government of any other coun-5 try. 6 (3) To encourage the Cuban people to empower 7 themselves with a government which reflects the self-8 determination of the Cuban people. 9 (4) To recognize the potential for a difficult 10 transition from the current regime in Cuba that may 11 result from the initiatives taken by the Cuban people 12 for self-determination in response to the intransigence of the Castro regime in not allowing any 13 14 substantive political or economic reforms, and to be 15 prepared to provide the Cuban people with humani-16 tarian, developmental, and other economic assist-17 ance. (5) In solidarity with the Cuban people, to pro-18 19 vide emergency relief assistance to a transition gov-20 ernment in Cuba and support to a democratically
  - ple.

    (6) Through such assistance, to facilitate a peaceful transition to representative democracy and

elected government in Cuba that result from an ex-

pression of the self-determination of the Cuban peo-

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a market economy in Cuba and to consolidate democraev in Cuba.

- (7) To deliver such assistance to the Cuban people only through a transition government in Cuba, through a democratically elected government in Cuba, or through United States, international, or indigenous nongovernmental organizations.
- (8) To encourage other countries and multilateral organizations to provide similar assistance, and to work cooperatively with such countries and organizations to coordinate such assistance.
- (9) To ensure that emergency relief is rapidly implemented and distributed to the people of Cuba upon the institution of a transition government in Cuba
- (10) Not to provide favorable treatment or influence on behalf of any individual or entity in the selection by the Cuban people of their future government.
- (11) To assist a transition government in Cuba and a democratically elected government in Cuba to prepare the Cuban military forces for an appropriate role in a democracy.
- (12) To be prepared to enter into negotiations with a democratically elected government in Cuba ei-

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1	ther to return the United States Naval Base at
2	Guantanamo to Cuba or to renegotiate the present
3	agreement under mutually agreeable terms.
4	(13) To consider the restoration of diplomatic
5	recognition and support the reintegration of the
6	Cuban government into Inter-American organiza-
7	tions when the President determines that there ex-
8	ists a democratically elected government in Cuba.
9	(14) To take steps to remove the economic em-
10	bargo of Cuba when the President determines that
11	there exists a democratically elected government in
12	Cuba.
13	(15) To assist a democratically elected govern-
14	ment in Cuba to strengthen and stabilize its national
15	currency.
16	(16) To pursue the extension of free trade ar-
17	rangements to a free, democratic, and independent
18	Cuba or to seek the creation of an economic commu-
19	nity with a free, democratic, and independent Cuba.
20	SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE
21	CUBAN PEOPLE.
22	(a) AUTHORIZATION.—
23	(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall develop
24	a plan for providing economic assistance to Cuba at
25	such time as the President determines that a transi-

I	tion government or a democratically elected govern-
2	ment (as determined under section 203(c)) is in
3	power in Cuba.
4	(2) Effect on other laws.—
5	(A) Superseding other laws.—Subject
6	to subparagraph (B), assistance may be pro-
7	vided under this section notwithstanding any
8	other provision of law.
9	(B) DETERMINATION REQUIRED REGARD-
10	ING PROPERTY TAKEN FROM UNITED STATES
11	PERSONS.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply
12	to section 620(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance
13	Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)(2)).
14	(b) Plan for Assistance.—
15	(1) Development of Plan.—The President
16	shall develop a plan for providing assistance under
17	this section—
18	(A) to a transition government in Cuba:
19	and
20	(B) to a democratically elected government
21	in Cuba.
22	(2) Types of assistance.—Assistance under
23	the plan developed under paragraph (1) shall include
24	the following:

1	(A) Transition government.—(i) Ex-
2	cept as provided in clause (ii), assistance to a
3	transition government in Cuba shall be limited
4	to—
5	(I) such food, medicine, medical sup-
6	plies and equipment, and assistance to
7	meet emergency energy needs, as is nec-
8	essary to meet the basic human needs of
9	the Cuban people; and
10	(II) assistance described in subpara-
11	graph (C).
12	(ii) Assistance to a transition government
13	in Cuba may include assistance for activities
14	comparable to those set forth in section 498 of
15	the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
16	2295) (other than paragraph (9) of such sec-
17	tion).
18	(iii) When a transition government in Cuba
19	is in power, remittances by individuals to their
20	relatives of cash or goods, as well as freedom to
21	travel to visit them without any restrictions,
22	shall be permitted.
23	(B) Democratically elected govern-
24	MENT.—Assistance to a democratically elected
25	government in Cuba shall consist of additional

1	economic assistance, together with assistance
2	described in subparagraph (C). Such economic
3	assistance may include—
4	(i) assistance under chapter 1 of part
5	I (relating to development assistance), and
6	chapter 4 of part $\Pi$ (relating to the eco-
7	nomic support fund), of the Foreign As-
8	sistance Act of 1961;
9	(ii) assistance under the Agricultural
10	Trade Development and Assistance Act of
11	1954;
12	(iii) financing, guarantees, and other
13	forms of assistance provided by the Ex-
14	port-Import Bank of the United States;
15	(iv) financial support provided by the
16	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
17	for investment projects in Cuba;
18	(v) assistance provided by the Trade
19	and Development Agency;
20	(vi) Peace Corps programs;
21	(vii) relief of Cuba's external debt;
22	and
23	(viii) other appropriate assistance to
24	carry out the policy of section 201.

1	(C) MILITARY ADJUSTMENT ASSIST-
2	ANCE.—Assistance to a transition government
3	in Cuba and to a democratically elected govern-
4	ment in Cuba shall also include assistance in
5	preparing the Cuban military forces to adjust to
6	an appropriate role in a democracy.
7	(c) Strategy for Distribution.—The plan devel-
8	oped under subsection (b) shall include a strategy for dis-
9	tributing assistance under the plan.
10	(d) DISTRIBUTION.—The plan developed under sub-
11	section (b) shall authorize assistance under the plan to
12	be provided through nongovernmental organizations and
13	private and voluntary organizations, whether within or
14	outside the United States, including humanitarian, edu-
15	cational, labor, and private sector organizations.
16	(e) International Efforts.—
17	(1) The President shall take the necessary
18	steps—
19	(A) to seek to obtain the agreement of
20	other countries and of international financial
21	institutions and multilateral organizations to
22	provide to a transition government in Cuba,
23	and to a democratically elected government in
24	Cuba, assistance comparable to that provided
25	by the United States under this Act; and

	00
1	(B) to work with such countries, institu-
2	tions, and organizations to coordinate all such
3	assistance programs.
4	(2)(A) The President shall take the necessary
5	steps to encourage the Organization of American
6	States to create a special emergency fund for the ex-
7	plicit purpose of deploying human rights observers,
8	election support, and election observation in Cuba.
9	(B) The President should instruct the United
10	States Permanent Representative to the Organiza-
11	tion of American States to encourage other member
12	states of the Organization to join in calling for the
13	Cuban Government to allow the immediate deploy-
14	ment of independent human rights monitors of the
15	Organization throughout Cuba and on-site visits to
16	Cuba by the Inter-American Commission on Human
17	Rights.
18	(C) The President shall withhold from payment
19	to the Organization of American States not less than
20	\$5,000,000 of the arrearages of the United States to
21	the Organization of American States as of the date
22	of enactment of this Act until the Organization of
23	American States agrees to make available an equiva-
24	lent amount solely for the purposes of the special

fund.

1	(f) CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE.—The President
2	shall determine, as part of the assistance plan developed
3	under subsection (b), whether or not to designate Cuba
4	as a beneficiary country under section 212 of the Carib-
5	bean Basin Economic Recovery Act.
6	(2) Any designation of Cuba as a beneficiary country
7	under section 212 of such Act may only be made after
8	a democratically elected government is in power. Such des-
9	ignation may be made notwithstanding any other provision
10	of law.
11	(3) The table contained in section 212(b) of the Car-
12	ibbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (19 U.S.C. 2702(b))
13	is amended by inserting "Cuba" between "Costa Rica"
14	and "Dominica".
15	(g) TRADE AGREEMENTS.—The President, upon
16	transmittal to Congress of a determination under section
17	203(e)(3) that a democratically elected government in
18	Cuba is in power—
19	(1) shall take the necessary steps to enter into
20	a preliminary agreement with such government in
21	Cuba providing for extension of the North American
22	Free Trade Agreement to a free and independent
23	Cuba or to seek the creation of an economic commu-

nity with a free, democratic, and independent Cuba;

and

1	(2) is authorized to enter into negotiations with
2	a democratic government in Cuba to provide for th
3	extension of the North American Free Trade Agree
4	ment (NAFTA) to Cuba or to seek the creation o
5	an economic community with a free, democratic, and
6	independent Cuba and to take such other steps as
7	will encourage renewed investment in Cuba.
8	(h) Communication With the Cuban People.—
9	The President shall take the necessary steps to commu
0	nicate to the Cuban people the plan for assistance devel-
1	oped under this section.
2	(i) Report to Congress.—Not later than 180 days
3	after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
4	shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees
5	a report describing in detail the plan developed under this
6	section.
7	SEC. 203. COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE PROGRAM; IM-
8	PLEMENTATION AND REPORTS TO CON-
9	GRESS; REPROGRAMMING.
0	(a) COORDINATING OFFICIAL.—The President shall
1	designate a coordinating official who shall be responsible
2	for—
3	(1) implementing the strategy for distributing
4	assistance under the plan developed under section
5	202(b);

1	(2) ensuring the speedy and efficient distribu-
2	tion of such assistance; and
3	(3) ensuring coordination among, and appro-
4	priate oversight by, the agencies of the United
5	States that provide assistance under the plan, in-
6	cluding resolving any disputes among such agencies.
7	(b) UNITED STATES-CUBA COUNCIL.—Upon making
8	a determination under subsection (c)(3) that a democrat-
9	ically elected government is in power in Cuba, the Presi-
10	dent, after consultation with the coordinating official, shall
11	designate a United States-Cuba council—
12	(1) to ensure coordination between the United
13	States Government and the private sector in re-
14	sponding to change in Cuba, and in promoting mar-
15	ket-based development in Cuba; and
16	(2) to establish periodic meetings between rep-
17	resentatives of the United States and Cuban private
18	sectors for the purpose of facilitating bilateral trade.
19	(e) Implementation of Plan: Reports to Con-
20	GRESS.—
21	(1) Implementation with respect to tran-
22	SITION GOVERNMENT.—Upon making a determina-
23	tion that a transition government in Cuba is in
24	power, the President shall transmit that determina-
25	tion to the appropriate congressional committees and

shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, commence the delivery and distribution of assistance to such transition government under the plan developed under section 202(b).

- (2) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—(A) The President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report setting forth the strategy for providing assistance described in section 202(b)(2) (A) and (C) to the transition government in Cuba under the plan of assistance developed under section 202(b), the types of such assistance, and the extent to which such assistance has been distributed in accordance with the plan.
- (B) The President shall transmit the report not later than 90 days after making the determination referred to in paragraph (1), except that the President shall transmit the report in preliminary form not later than 15 days after making that determination.
- (3) IMPLEMENTATION WITH RESPECT TO DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT.—The President shall, upon determining that a democratically elected government in Cuba is in power, submit that determination to the appropriate congressional committees and shall, subject to the availabil-

- ity of appropriations, commence the delivery and distribution of assistance to such democratically elected government under the plan developed under section 4 202(b).
- 5 (4) Annual reports to congress.—Not. 6 later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year, 7 the President shall transmit to the appropriate con-8 gressional committees a report on the assistance 9 provided under the plan developed under section 202(b), including a description of each type of as-10 11 sistance, the amounts expended for such assistance, 12 and a description of the assistance to be provided 13 under the plan in the current fiscal year.
- (d) REPROGRAMMING.—Any changes in the assist15 ance to be provided under the plan developed under sec16 tion 202(b) may not be made unless the President notifies
  17 the appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days
  18 in advance in accordance with the procedures applicable
  19 to reprogramming notifications under section 634A of the
  20 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
- 21 SEC. 204. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Presi-
- 23 dent such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act.

	50
1	SEC. 205. TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF
2	CUBA.
3	(a) Presidential Actions.—Upon submitting a de
4	termination to the appropriate congressional committees
5	under section 203(c)(3) that a democratically elected government
6	ernment in Cuba is in power, the President shall take
7	steps to terminate the economic embargo of Cuba.
8	(b) Conforming Amendments.—On the date on
9	which the President submits a determination under sec-
10	tion 203(c)(3)—
11	(1) section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance
12	Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)) is repealed;
13	(2) section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act
14	of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(f)) is amended by striking
15	"Republic of Cuba"; and
16	(3) the prohibitions on transactions described in
17	part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
18	shall cease to apply.
19	SEC. 206. REQUIREMENTS FOR A TRANSITION GOVERN-
20	MENT.
21	For purposes of this Act, a transition government in
22	Cuba is a government in Cuba which—
23	(1) is demonstrably in transition from com-
24	munist totalitarian dictatorship to representative de-
25	mocracy;
26	(2) has legalized all political activity;

1	(3) has released all political prisoners and al-
2	lowed for investigations of Cuban prisons by appro-
3	priate international human rights organizations;
4	(4) has ceased any interference with Radio or
5	Television Marti broadcasts:
6	(5) makes public commitments to and is mak-
7	ing demonstrable progress in—
8	(A) establishing an independent judiciary:
9	(B) dissolving the present Department of
0	State Security in the Cuban Ministry of the In-
1	terior, including the Committees for the De-
2	fense of the Revolution and the Rapid Response
3	Brigades;
4	(C) respecting internationally recognized
5	human rights and basic freedoms as set forth in
6	the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to
7	which Cuba is a signatory nation;
8	(D) effectively guaranteeing the rights of
9	free speech and freedom of the press;
0.	(E) organizing free and fair elections for a
1	new government—
2	(i) to be held in a timely manner with-
3	in a period not to exceed 2 years after the
4	transition government assumes power;

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(ii) with the participation of multiple

2	independent political parties that have full
3	access to the media on an equal basis, in-
4	cluding (in the case of radio, television, or
5	other telecommunications media) in terms
6	of allotments of time for such access and
7	the times of day such allotments are given:
8	and
9	(iii) to be conducted under the super-
10	vision of internationally recognized observ-
11	ers, such as the Organization of American
12	States, the United Nations, and other elec-
13	tions monitors;
14	(F) assuring the right to private property;
15	(G) taking appropriate steps to return to
16	United States citizens and entities property
17	taken by the Government of Cuba from such
18	citizens and entities on or after January 1,
19	1959, or to provide equitable compensation to
20	such citizens and entities for such property;
21	(H) granting permits to privately owned
22	telecommunications and media companies to op-
23	erate in Cuba; and

1	(I) allowing the establishment of an inde-
2	pendent labor movement and of independent so-
3	cial, economic, and political associations;
4	(6) does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Cas-
5	tro;
6	(7) has given adequate assurances that it will
7	allow the speedy and efficient distribution of assist-
8	ance to the Cuban people; and
9	(8) permits the deployment throughout Cuba of
0	independent and unfettered international human
1	rights monitors.
2	SEC. 207. REQUIREMENTS FOR A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECT-
3	ED GOVERNMENT.
4	For purposes of this Act, a democratically elected
5	government in Cuba, in addition to continuing to comply
6	with the requirements of section 206, is a government in
7	Cuba which—
8	(1) results from free and fair elections con-
9	ducted under the supervision of internationally rec-
О	ognized observers;
1	(2) has permitted opposition parties ample time
2	to organize and campaign for such elections, and has
3	permitted full access to the media to all candidates
4	in the elections;

- (3) is showing respect for the basic civil liberties and human rights of the citizens of Cuba;
  - (4) has made demonstrable progress in establishing an independent judiciary;
  - (5) is substantially moving toward a market-oriented economic system;
  - (6) is committed to making constitutional changes that would ensure regular free and fair elections that meet the requirements of paragraph (2); and
  - (7) has made demonstrable progress in returning to United States citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken by the Government of Cuba from such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 1959, or providing full compensation in accordance with international law standards and practice.

1	TITLE III-PROTECTION OF
2	AMERICAN PROPERTY
3	RIGHTS ABROAD
4	SEC. 301. EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES OF
5	ALIENS WHO HAVE CONFISCATED PROPERTY
6	OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS.
7	(a) Additional Grounds for Exclusion.—Sec-
8	tion $212(a)(9)$ of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
9	U.S.C. 1182(a)) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
	lowing:
	"(D) ALIENS WHO HAVE CONFISCATED
	AMERICAN PROPERTY ABROAD AND RELATED
	PERSONS.—(i) Any alien who—
14	"(I) has confiscated, or has directed
15	or overseen the confiscation of, property
16	the claim to which is owned by a United
17	States person, or converts or has converted
18	for personal gain confiscated property, the
19	claim to which is owned by a United States
20	person;
21	"(II) traffics in confiscated property,
22	the claim to which is owned by a United
23	States person;
24	``(III) is a corporate officer, principal,
25	or shareholder of an entity which has been

1	involved in the confiscation, trafficking in,
2	or subsequent unauthorized use or benefit
3	from confiscated property, the claim to
4	which is owned by a United States person,
5	or
6	``(IV) is a spouse or child, or depend-
7	ent (as defined in section 152 of the Inter-
8	nal Revenue Code of 1986) of a person de-
9	scribed in subclause (I),
10	is excludable.
11	"(ii) The validity of claims under this sub-
12	paragraph shall be established in accordance
13	with section 303 of the Cuban Liberty and
14	Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
15	1995.
16	"(iii) For purposes of this subparagraph,
17	the terms 'confiscated', 'property', 'traffics',
18	and 'United States person' have the same
19	meanings given to such terms under section 4
20	of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
21	(LIBERTAD) Act of 1995.".
22	(b) Effective Date.—The amendment made by
23	subsection (a) shall apply to individuals entering the Unit-
24	ed States on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

	10
1	SEC. 302, LIABILITY FOR TRAFFICKING IN PROPERTY CON-
2	FISCATED FROM UNITED STATES NATIONALS.
3	(a) Civil Remedy.—(1) Effective on the day after
4	the date of enactment of this Act, and except as provided
5	in paragraphs (2) and (3), any person or government that
6	traffics in property confiscated by a foreign government
7	shall be liable to the United States person who owns the
8	confiscated property or claim thereto for money damages
9	in an amount which is the greater of—
10	(A)(i) the amount certified by the Foreign
11	Claims Settlement Commission under the Inter-
12	national Claims Settlement Act of 1949;
13	(ii) interest at the commercially recognized nor-
14	mal rate; and
15	(iii) reasonable attorneys' fees:
16	(B) the amount determined under section
17	303(a)(2); or
18	(C) the fair market value of that property, cal-
19	culated as being the then current value of the prop-
20	erty, or the value of the property when confiscated
21	plus interest at the commercially recognized normal
22	rate, whichever is greater.
23	(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), any person
24	or government that traffics in confiscated property after
25	having received (A) notice of a claim to ownership of the
26	property by the United States person who owns the claim

- 1 to the confiscated property, and (B) a copy of this section,
- 2 shall be liable to such United States person for money
- 3 damages in an amount which is treble the amount speci-
- 4 fied in paragraph (1), excluding attorney's fees.
- 5 (3)(A) Actions may be brought under paragraph (1)
- 6 with respect to property confiscated before, on, or after
- 7 the date of enactment of this Act.
- 8 (B) In the case of property confiscated before the
- 9 date of enactment of this Act, no United States person
- 10 may bring an action under this section unless such person
- 11 acquired ownership of the claim to the confiscated prop-
- 12 erty before such date.
- 13 (C) In the case of property confiscated on or after
- 14 the date of enactment of this Act, in order to maintain
- 15 the action, the United States person who is the plaintiff
- 16 must demonstrate to the court that the plaintiff has taken
- 17 reasonable steps to exhaust any available local remedies.
- 18 (b) Jurisdiction.—
- 19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 85 of title 28, Unit-
- 20 ed States Code, is amended by inserting after sec-
- 21 tion 1331 the following new section:
- 22 "§ 1331a. Civil actions involving confiscated property
- 23 "(a) The district courts shall have exclusive jurisdic-
- 24 tion, without regard to the amount in controversy, of any

- action brought under section 302 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995. "(b) Service of a summons or filing a waiver of serv-3 ice with respect to claims arising under section 302 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995 is effective to establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant if made in any district where a defendant resides or may be found.". 9 (2) Conforming amendment.—The table of sections for chapter 85 of title 28, United States 10 Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating 11 12 to section 1331 the following: "1331a. Civil actions involving confiscated property.". 13 (c) Wanter of Sovereign Immunity.—Section 14 1605(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended— (1) by striking "or" at the end of paragraph 15 (5): 16 17 (2) by striking the period at the end of para-18 graph (6) and inserting "; or"; and (3) by adding at the end the following: 19 20 "(7) in which the action is brought with respect to confiscated property under section 302 of the 21 22 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995.". 23
- (d) Additional Rights of Action.—The right ofaction created in this section is in addition to any right

- 1 that may exist under the common law, Federal law, or
- 2 the law of any of the several States, the District of Colum-
- 3 bia, or any territory or possession of the United States,
- 4 and nothing in this action shall act to adversely affect or
- 5 derogate such other rights in any way.
- 6 SEC. 303. CLAIMS TO CONFISCATED PROPERTY.
- 7 (a) EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP.—For purposes of
- 8 this Act, conclusive evidence of ownership by a United
- 9 States person of a claim to confiscated property is estab-
- 10 lished-
- 11 (1) when the Foreign Claims Settlement Com-
- 12 mission certifies the claim under the International
- 13 Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended by sub-
- 14 section (b);
- 15 (2) when the claim has been determined to be
- 16 valid by a court or administrative agency of the
- 17 country in which the property was confiscated; or
- 18 (3) when the claim has been determined to be
- 19 valid by a court or administrative agency of the
- 20 United States.
- 21 (b) Amendment of the International Claims
- 22 Settlement Act of 1949.—Title V of the International
- 23 Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (22 U.S.C. 1643 and fol-
- 24 lowing) is amended by adding at the end the following new
- 25 section:

1	"ADDITIONAL CLAIMS
2	"Sec. 514. Notwithstanding any other provision of
3	this title, a United States national may bring a claim to
4	the Commission for determination and certification under
5	this title of the amount and validity of a claim resulting
6	from actions taken by the Government of Cuba described
7	in section 503(a), whether or not the United States na-
8	tional qualified as a United States national at the time
9	of the Cuban government action, except that, in the case
10	of property confiscated after the date of enactment of this
11	section, the claimant must be a United States national at
12	the time of the confiscation.".
13	(c) Conforming Amendment.—Section 510 of the
14	International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (22 U.S.C.
15	1643) is amended by striking "The" and inserting "Ex-
16	cept in the case of claims under section 514, the".
17	SEC. 304. AMENDMENT OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
18	OF 1986.
19	Section 1351 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
20	shall be amended as follows:
21	(1) The word "That" shall be deleted from the
22	beginning of paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of sec-
23	tion 1351 and the following language shall be added:
24	"Except in cases of recovery of Cuban expropriation
25	loss, that".

(2) A new paragraph (5) shall be added to sub-
section (d) of section 1351, as follows: "Definition of
Cuban Expropriation Loss.—For purposes of this
section, the term "Cuban expropriation loss" means
any loss sustained by reason of the expropriation,
intervention, seizure or similar taking of property by
the communist government of Cuba, any political
subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality
of the foregoing.".

## AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 927 OFFERED BY MR. TORRICELLI

Page 42, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert the following:

1	(I) allowing the establishment of independ-
2	ent trade unions as set forth in conventions 87
3	and 98 of the International Labor Organiza-
4	tion, and allowing the establishment of inde-
5	pendent social, economic, and political associa-
6	tions;

## AMENDMENT TO H.R. 927 OFFERED BY MR. MENENDEZ

Add the following at the end of section 102:

1	(e) VIOLATIONS UNDER THE TRADING WITH THE
2	ENEMY ACT.—Subsection (b) of section 16 of the Trading
3	With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 16(b)), as amended
4	by section 1710(c) of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992,
5	is amended—
6	(1) in paragraph (3)—
7	(A) by striking "may not be" and inserting
8	"may be";
9	(B) in subparagraph (A) by striking "; or"
10	and inserting ", or"; and
11	(C) in subparagraph (B) by striking "par-
12	ticipants." and inserting "participants,
13	that are not licensed or otherwise authorized pursuant to
14	this Act."; and
15	(2) by striking paragraph (4) and redesignating
16	paragraph (5) as paragraph (4).

